We use the 2007 credit crisis to gauge the e¤ect of …nancial contracting on real corporate behavior. We identify heterogeneity in …nancial contracting at the onset of the crisis by exploiting ex-ante variation in long-term debt maturity. Our empirical methodology accounts for observed and unobserved time-invariant …rm characteristics by employing a di¤erence-in-di¤erences matching estimator. We …nd that …rms whose long-term debt was largely maturing right after the third quarter of 2007 reduced investment by 2.5% more (on a quarterly basis) than otherwise similar …rms whose debt was scheduled to mature well after 2008. This relative decline in investment is statistically and economically signi…cant, representing one-third of pre-crisis investment levels. A number of falsi…cation and placebo tests con…rm our inferences about the e¤ect of credit supply shocks on corporate policies. For example, in the absence of a credit shock ("normal times"), the maturity composition of long-term debt has no e¤ect on investment. Likewise, maturity composition has no impact on investment in the crisis for …rms for which long-term debt is not a major source of funding. Our study highlights the importance of debt maturity for corporate …nancial policy. It shows how …nancial contracting ties credit supply shocks and …rm real decisions.
Introduction
Does …nancial contracting have real implications? How do …rms respond to shifts in the supply of credit? The endogeneity of …nancing and investment decisions makes it di¢ cult to answer these questions. To complicate matters, credit supply shocks often confound …nancial and economic factors that a¤ect …rm behavior. One common-place approach to studying the e¤ect of credit shocks on …rm behavior is to look at …nancing activity (e.g., loans or equity issues) that takes place over the credit cycle.
Unfortunately, this approach is compromised by the fact that observed transactions may re ‡ect a shift in the supply of credit (e.g., lower supply of loans in a monetary contraction) as well as a shift in the demand for credit (…rms demand less loans if economic conditions adversely a¤ect their investment plans). Likewise, it is di¢ cult to identify a causal link going from …rm …nancing to …rm investment during a credit contraction because unobserved economic factors (e.g., …rm business fundamentals) may drive both ex-ante …nancial contracting and ex-post real outcomes.
We develop a novel strategy to gauge the e¤ect of …nancial contracting on real corporate outcomes following a shift in the supply of credit. We do so using the credit crisis (or "panic") of 2007.
This event is unique among other credit shortage episodes in that it originated from problems arising from non-corporate assets: housing mortgages. Gorton (2008) provides a detailed analysis of the various forces leading to a sharp reduction in liquidity that a¤ected …nancial institutions dealing with subprime-based derivatives starting in mid-2007. The lack of transparency on long-term investments of …nancial institutions, and the possibility that losses on credit derivatives would be passed on to their balance sheets created a panic that e¤ectively shut down short-term …nancing to banks and other institutions ). As we document below, the crisis quickly spilled over into the market for long-term corporate debt, resulting in sharp increases in bond spreads in the Fall of 2007.
The 2007 episode arguably provides for a shock to the supply of external …nancing that is not caused by the weakening of …rm business fundamentals. Naturally, businesses are eventually a¤ected by credit shortages, ultimately changing their demand for credit. These confounding e¤ects make it important that we identify a one-sided shock, when it emerges. We note, however, that simply exploring an event of this type is insu¢ cient to identify a causal link between …nancial contracting and corporate outcomes. In particular, while general credit conditions may exacerbate the relation between variables such as …nancial leverage and investment, one cannot ascertain whether …nancial contracting causes …rms to behave in a particular way. To establish that channel, one needs to identity a feature of …nancial contracts whose variation can be considered exogenous at the time of the credit shock.
We identify heterogeneity in …nancial contracting at the onset of the 2007 crisis by exploiting exante variation in long-term debt maturity. In a nutshell, we examine whether …rms with large fractions of their long-term debt maturing at the time of the crisis are forced to adjust their behavior (e.g., by cutting capital expenditures) in ways that are more pronounced than otherwise similar …rms that need not re…nance their long-term obligations during the crisis. To the extent that these e¤ects are large, they constitute true costs of …nancial distress and provide evidence that the terms of …nancial contracting -in this case, contract maturity -can a¤ect real corporate outcomes.
It is important that we discuss how our focus on long-term debt maturity works as an identi…cation tool. The literature on debt structure has shown that the choice between short-versus long-term debt is correlated with …rm characteristics such as size, pro…tability, and credit ratings (see, e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995) and Guedes and Opler (1996) ). As such, in general, the determination of debt maturity creates di¢ culties for the identi…cation of unconfounded causal e¤ects of …nancial contracting on real outcomes. Rather than contrasting short-and long-term debt, we look at the proportion of long-term debt that matures right after August 2007 to assess how …rms are a¤ected by credit supply shifts. Note that long-term debt is typically publicly-held and di¢ cult to renegotiate on short notice (see Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) ). This makes it hard to argue that …rms are at their "debt-maturity targets" at all times. Indeed, an extensive literature discusses how …rms seem to deviate for years from their desired debt-to-asset ratios. 1 The ability to secure an optimal debt-maturity composition would probably be a lower-order concern if …rms are unable to secure the overall debt positions they might desire. Because these hard-to-reverse decisions a¤ecting the maturity of a …rm's long-term debt were made several years prior to the Fall of 2007, whether the …rm was pre-scheduled to re…nance a large fraction of its long-term debt right at the onset of the crisis is plausibly exogenous to the …rm's performance following the crisis. We exploit this friction ("maturity-structure discontinuity") in our analysis, noting that, to our knowledge, none of the papers in the existing empirical literature has studied the implications of the maturity path of long-term debt contracts.
While we argue that cross-…rm variation in the proportion of long-term debt that comes due right after August of 2007 is likely to be exogenous to …rm outcomes over the crisis, one might wonder if other sources of …rm heterogeneity could underlie the relations we might observe. To tackle this concern, we use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences matching estimator approach that incorporates observable …rm characteristics and accounts for unobservable, time-invariant …rm e¤ects. The goal of our empirical methodology is to replicate an experiment-like setting in which …rm …nancial status can be seen as a "treatment."To minimize concerns about selection, we match …rms that we expect to be more susceptible to the negative e¤ects of …nancial distress (i.e., those …rms that happened to have a non-trivial fraction of their long-term debt coming due when the crisis hit) with "control"…rms that we do not expect to be susceptible to distress (…rms that have most of their long-term debt coming due many years after the shock). We match these two groups of …rms on the basis of their asset size, industry classi…ca-tion, credit ratings, Q, long-term leverage ratio, cash ‡ows, and cash holdings. This matching is meant to assure that we are comparing otherwise similar …rms, with the only salient di¤erence between the two groups being the composition of their long-term debt maturity. The tests we perform further account for time-invariant …rm heterogeneity by comparing within-…rm changes in the outcome variables of interest from the period that precedes the 2007 credit shock to the period that follows the shock. 2 Importantly, we consider a number of alternatives to our basic empirical design. These alternative tests provide checks for the logic of our empirical approach and further minimize concerns about hard-wiring in our results. For example, we perform a battery of falsi…cation tests that replicate our matching estimator procedure in non-crisis periods. In principle, a …rm whose debt matures at a time in which credit is easily available should not display a distressed-type behavior that can be linked to debt maturity. It is only the juxtaposition of …rm debt maturity and a credit crisis that should a¤ect investment. In addition, we rede…ne our treatment and control groups based on the degree to which long-term debt is an important component of …rm …nancing. According to the logic of our strategy, for those …rms for which long-term debt is only a small fraction of total …nancing, we should not see a link between investment spending and the fact that some long-term debt is maturing in the crisis.
To further ensure that the assignment of …rms into treatment and control groups is exogenous to the post-2007 crisis outcomes, we also perform tests in which we measure maturity structure several years prior to the credit crisis. This allows us to rule out more subtle unobserved heterogeneity stories, such as "smart CEOs" anticipating the August 2007 panic and re…nancing (prior to the crisis) the part of their …rms'long-term debt that is scheduled to mature in 2008.
Our …ndings are as follows. We …rst document a pronounced cross-sectional variation in the maturity structure of long-term debt at the onset of the 2007 credit crisis. Variation in long-term debt maturity is persistent across time, and we …nd no evidence that it changed in the years leading up to the 2007 crisis. These results are interesting in their own right and suggest that future researchers may use long-term debt maturity structure to gauge a plausibly unconfounded source of heterogeneity in …rm …nancial status. Importantly for our strategy, we are able to isolate …rms with a large fraction of long-term debt maturing right after the crisis (the treated …rms) that are virtually identical to other …rms whose debt happens to mature in later years (the control group). These two groups of …rms are similar across all characteristics we consider except debt maturity structure. For example, …rms in the two groups display similar investment rates in the quarters leading up to the crisis (around 7:5% of capital on a quarterly basis).
We then show that a …rm's debt maturity structure has consequences for post-crisis real outcomes. 3 For …rms in the treatment group, quarterly investment rates decreased to 5:7% of capital on average 2 We perform these tests using the Abadie and Imbens (2002) matching estimator. The same estimator has been used by Villalonga (2004) , Malmendier and Tate (2009), and Campello, Graham, and Harvey (2009) . 3 Anticipating the details of the experiment, the pre-crisis period is de…ned as the …rst three quarters of 2007, and the post-crisis period is de…ned as the …rst three quarters of 2008. The matching variables are averaged over the …rst three quarters of 2007. The treatment group contains …rms for which the fraction of long-term debt maturing within one year (i.e.,during 2008) is greater than 20%, while the control group contains …rms for which that fraction is lower than 20%. The baseline experiment focuses on …rms whose long-term debt is greater than 5% of assets.
-a fall of 2:1% relative to their pre-crisis level. In contrast, …rms in the control group hardly changed their investment. The Abadie-Imbens estimate of the di¤erence-in-di¤erences in investment behavior is 2:5% in our baseline experiment. This drop in investment is economically substantive as it represents a decline of approximately one-third of pre-crisis investment levels. Con…rming the logic of our strategy, the relation between maturity structure and investment disappears when we use …rms with insigni…cant amounts of long-term debt in the experiment. On the ‡ip side, that relation strengthens when we focus on …rms for which long-term debt is a more important source of …nancing (in this case, the relative drop in investment is 3:4%). We also …nd that the e¤ect of maturity structure on investment is robust to variations in the de…nitions of treatment and control groups. Moreover, it holds only for the 2007 crisis. In particular, we replicate our experiment over a number of years and …nd that maturity structure is unrelated with changes in investment for these non-crisis (placebo) periods.
A standard concern about inferences from studies using the di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimator in a treatment e¤ects framework is whether treatment and control group outcomes followed "parallel trends" prior to the treatment -only in this case one can ascribe di¤erences in the post-treatment period to the treatment itself. Another potential concern is whether alternative "macro e¤ects" that di¤erentially a¤ect treatment and control groups might explain the di¤erential behavior we observe in the post-treatment period. Our matching estimator ensures that we are comparing …rms from the same industry with very similar characteristics such as credit quality, size, and pro…tability, which would suggest that these …rms would respond very similarly to the recession in the absence of …nanc-ing frictions. Still, one cannot completely rule out the possibility that there are latent di¤erences between treatment and control groups and that these di¤erences trigger contrasting behaviors in the post-treatment period because of events -other than the treatment -taking place in that period.
We consider both of these concerns in our analysis. First, we explicitly compare the pre-treatment trends in the outcomes (changes in investment) of our treatment and control groups. Going back several years prior to the 2007 shock, we …nd no evidence that the investment path of …rms in those two groups followed di¤erent trends. Second, we consider the concern that the recession that followed the 2007 shock may drive a di¤erential wedge in the post-crisis investment of treatment and control …rms, irrespective of the observed credit shortage. To deal with this concern, we look for a period that precedes a recession, but that lacks a sharp credit supply shock to identify a placebo treatment. In other words, we try to eliminate the salient "credit component" of our treatment strategy, but allow for the same post-treatment macro e¤ect (demand contraction) that could potentially drive our 2007 results. Although it is di¢ cult to …nd a recession that is not preceded by a credit tightening, we argue that the 2001 recession was not preceded by a credit shortage that is comparable to the crisis that started in 2007. This falsi…cation test shows no evidence of a di¤erential recession-driven behavior for our treatment and controls …rms. That is, one does need the pronounced credit component of the 2007 crisis to …nd that …rms with more debt due around a credit shortage invest signi…cantly less afterwards. Naturally, the large e¤ect of maturing debt on investment in 2008 raises the question of whether …rms adjusted along other margins to accommodate the joint e¤ects of the credit crisis and the need to repay a lot of debt in the short run. In particular, …rms may have adjusted other real and …nancial policies, such as drawing down cash balances, reducing inventory stocks, repurchasing fewer shares, and cutting dividends. To provide some evidence on this point, in the last part of the paper, we perform a "back-of-the-envelope" analysis of how the treated …rms responded to the crisis. Our calculations suggest that the …rms that were burdened with large amounts of maturing debt in 2008 tapped their "least costly"sources of funds. Notably, consistent with Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , we …nd that the brunt of the shock to external funding was absorbed by …rms'cash balances. Reductions in inventory were also pronounced across treated …rms (see Fazzari and Petersen (1993) ).
There are only a handful of empirical papers looking at the dispersion of corporate debt maturity (e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995) , Stohs and Mauer (1996) , and Guedes and Opler (1996) ). These papers consider issues other than the e¤ect of supply shocks on real corporate policies. Barclay and Smith report that …rms that are large and with fewer growth options have more long-term debt in their capital structures. In addition, Guedes and Opler show that large …rms with high-quality credit ratings typically borrow on the short and long ends of the maturity spectrum, while …rms with poor credit ratings borrow mid-term. Theory has also looked at the determinants of maturity structure, suggesting that both low-and high-credit quality …rms are likely to borrow short-term, but for di¤er-ent reasons (Diamond (1991 (Diamond ( , 1993 and Flannery (1986) ). High-quality credit …rms borrow short-term to signal that they are not concerned with the possibility of liquidity shocks, while low-quality …rms might have no alternatives to bank debt-…nancing with restrictive covenants and frequent renegotiations. The existing literature highlights the identi…cation problem that we tackle in this paper. For instance, …rms that use short-term bank …nancing are inherently more likely to be a¤ected by a credit supply shock. As a result, one cannot measure the e¤ect of maturity structure on real outcomes simply by relating the pre-crisis amounts of short-versus long-term debt and post-crisis outcomes. 4 Our paper is related to recent studies on the e¤ects of credit supply shocks and it is important that we di¤erentiate our …ndings. Lemmon and Roberts (2009) examine the e¤ects of a contraction in the supply of risky credit (junk bonds) in 1989 that was induced by regulatory changes and the collapse of Drexel Burnham Lambert. Their evidence suggests that junk bond issuers' investment declined as a result of changes in the bond market landscape. Our study di¤ers from Lemmon and Roberts in a number of ways. Firstly, those authors'test strategy focuses on …rms that are assigned to a di¤erent, high-risk category by the credit markets. It is fair to argue that junk bond issuers are of a inherently di¤erent quality, and it is ultimately di¢ cult to …nd appropriate counterfactuals for them, even if one is able to …nd ordinary …rms of similar size, age, pro…tability, and leverage ratios, as the authors do. Our treatment and control …rms, in contrast, are only di¤erent because of a "local discontinuity" in their long-term maturity structure, a discontinuity that only becomes meaningful because of a sharp, well-identi…ed credit shock. Secondly, those authors compare the behaviors of their treatment and control …rms over a period encompassing the 1990-1991 recession. It is di¢ cult to ascertain whether their treated (riskier) …rms invested less after 1989 because of di¢ culties in the junk bond market or if they would invest less in the downturn independently of any developments in the market for junk bonds. Our paper also examines data from a recession, but we provide explicit tests that address this type of confounding "macro e¤ects" problem. Indeed, we uniquely provide a number of falsi…cation tests, challenging each of one of the elements of our strategy. Thirdly, it is a matter of argument whether regulation put in place to prevent S&Ls and insurance companies from investing in junk bonds are exogenous to the collapse of the junk bond market. In particular, it should not be surprising to see restrictions put in place to prevent …nancial institutions from investing in securities whose payo¤s are particularly risky (junk bonds), an argument that implies a reverse causation between treatment and observed outcomes. Finally, Lemmon and Roberts's paper does not cover the current …nancial crisis, which is the sharpest credit shortage in nearly a century. 5 Similarly to our paper, Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2009) focus on the impact of the current credit crisis on corporate investment. Their attempt at identifying …rms that are more or less a¤ected by the crisis hinges on …rms'cash and debt positions. While appealing, as discussed above, their proposed strategy is subject to the criticism that …rms'cash and debt policies prior to the crisis will confound factors that may well explain those …rms' post-crisis behavior. This makes it di¢ cult to ascribe causality going from …nancial policy to real …rm outcomes, which is the question of ultimate interest.
Our study contains important implications for corporate …nancial policy. Our results show, for example, that …rms with similar debt-to-asset ratios may respond quite di¤erently to a credit supply shock. Indeed, …rms with relatively low debt ratios can be more a¤ected by such shocks, depending on the maturity composition of their debt. This suggests additional caution when sorting …rms based on their observed leverage ratios as a way to gauge their response to macroeconomic events. Our study is new in highlighting the extra attention corporate managers should pay to the maturity pro…le of their …rms'debt. Debt maturity is an important aspect of …nancial ‡exibility, an aspect that -as we demonstrate -becomes particularly important during contractions. Finally, our study is one of only a handful of papers in corporate …nance that uses well-identi…ed elements of …nancial contracting to show how …nancial contracts a¤ect …rm behavior (see also Chava and Roberts (2008) ).
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. We discuss our empirical strategy in Section 2. Our baseline result that the …nancial contracting (debt maturity structure) a¤ects real corporate outcomes is presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we conduct a number of additional tests designed to check the robustness of our results. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Empirical Design
We start this section by describing our basic experimental design and the matching estimator methodology we employ in the paper. We then describe the data used in our tests.
The "Experiment"
Our basic insight is that of exploiting variation in long-term debt maturity at the onset of the 2007 crisis episode as a way to identify the e¤ect of credit supply shocks on corporate policies. Of course, the relevant question is how would the composition of long-term debt maturity a¤ect real corporate policies. In a frictionless capital markets, debt maturity is irrelevant because …rms can always re…nance and recontract their way around the potential e¤ects of a balloon debt payment. What is special about credit crises is that …nancial markets are arguably less than frictionless during those times. The 2007 crisis, in particular, a¤ected traditional modes of corporate …nancing, such as commercial paper, bond placements, bank loans, and secondary equity issuance. In such an environment, soon-to-mature debt can e¤ectively reduce corporate investment, as …rms …nd it di¢ cult to substitute across alternative funding sources while at the same time trying to avoid defaulting on their debt payments. As a result, …rms that were "unfortunate" to have large chunks of debt maturing around the 2007 crisis may be expected to face tighter …nancing constraints than …rms that do not have to …nance balloon debt payments during that same period.
The 2007 Credit Supply Shock
As discussed by Gorton (2008) and Acharya, Philippon, Richardson, and Roubini (2009) SIVs) relied on short-term rollover debt to …nance holdings of long-term assets. By early August 2007, it was clear that investors were no longer willing to rollover short-term …nancing to highly-levered institutions, as exempli…ed by the run on BNP Paribas'SIVs. 6 These runs were observed across many countries and markets in subsequent weeks. They were largely attributed to the perceived lack of transparency of the investment portfolios of …nancial institutions, and the possibility that large losses would be passed on to the balance sheet of banks that sponsored investment vehicles such as SIVs.
As a result of these developments, the spreads on short-term …nancing instruments quickly reached historically high levels. This is illustrated by the time series of the 3-month LIBOR and commercial paper spreads over comparable-maturity treasuries. These series are plotted in Figure The repricing of credit instruments that followed by the 2007 panic quickly went beyond shortterm bank …nancing, spilling over into longer-term instruments. Indeed, the crisis highlighted the interdependence of segments of the …nancial market that were once thought of as being isolated from each other. The lack of availability of short-term …nancing is believed to have softened the demand for long-term bonds by institutions such as hedge funds and insurance companies. The collapse of the "repo" market further a¤ected the demand for highly-rated corporate bonds, which were used as collateral for borrowing agreements during "normal times." Current research on the crisis (and anecdotal evidence) suggests that these developments led spreads on long-term corporate bonds to increase sharply. In Figure 2 , we report the time series of spreads for indices of investment grade and high yield bonds (from Citigroup's Yieldbook ). 7 Citigroup reports average duration and maturity for the bond portfolios used in the construction of these indices. Given the reported durations, which hover between 4 and 7 years, we choose the 5-year treasury rate as a benchmark to calculate spreads. We note that the average credit quality of Citigroup's investment-grade and high-yield indices is, respectively, A and B+. Thus, Figure 2 gives a fairly complete picture of the e¤ect of the crisis on the spreads of bonds with di¤erent credit quality. in early 2007 to 4:6% in August, and then to between 7% and 8% in early 2008. 9 Similar signs of a 7 We use Citigroup's BIG_CORP (investment-grade) and HY_MARKET (high-yield) indices. Almeida and Philippon (2007) also use Yieldbook data to calculate corporate bond spreads by rating level. 8 The spreads we present are very similar to the high-yield bond spreads reported in Figure P .2 in Acharya, Philippon, Richardson, and Roubini (2009) . 9 Clearly, the Lehman crisis in the Fall of 2008 had an additional negative impact on bond spreads, which shot up momentarily to levels close to 7% for investment-grade bonds, and above 15% for high-yield bonds.
credit squeeze in the U.S. bond markets can be gathered from quantity data. According to SDC's New Issues Database, the total debt issuance with maturity greater than one year for the third quarter of 2007 amounted to $63 billion. There were a total of 165 deals registered in that quarter. To put these numbers in perspective, the average quarterly amount of funds raised in the bond market in the two years preceding the crisis was $337 billion, while the average number of deals was 1,476.
At the same time that …rms found it di¢ cult to raise funds in the bond markets, banks were also cut- The available evidence substantiates our conjecture that the current …nancial crisis was associated with a substantial increase in the cost of both short-term and long-term …nancing for …rms, starting with the events of August 2007. These increases appear to be at least partly due to a credit supply shock which initiated in the housing sector and eventually a¤ected …nancial institutions and the overall credit markets. Such an environment provides us with a unique opportunity to identify the e¤ects of supply contractions on corporate policies.
The Maturity Structure of Corporate Long-Term Debt
Our identi…cation strategy requires two conditions to be met. First, and most simply, there has to be enough variation in debt maturity to allow for comparisons across …rms. In particular, there must exist a signi…cant group of …rms that have a spike ("discontinuity") in their long-term debt maturity structure appearing right after the crisis. Naturally, one could expect …rms to have well-diversi…ed maturity structures, so that they are never forced to repay or re…nance signi…cant amounts of debt in any particular year. If that was the case, it would be di¢ cult for us to implement our proposed strategy. As discussed in the introduction, and elsewhere in the literature, there seems to exist a number of …rst-order frictions making it di¢ cult for …rms to maintain their optimal capital structures -this, assuming …rms do pursue such policies in the …rst place. It would be hard to imagine that …rms are generally unable to be at their optimal debt-to-asset ratios for many consecutive years, while at the same time maintaining an optimal debt maturity structure. The existing literature provides little guidance on this conjecture. Thus, it is interesting to discuss this possibility in more detail. Figure 3 depicts the distribution of debt maturities for the sample of …rms that we use in our analysis (the data are described in detail in Section 2.3), calculated at the onset of the 2007 crisis. For each …rm, we have information on the amount of long-term debt that matures in each of the following …ve years : 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. 10 Figure 3 reports these amounts as a fraction of total long-term debt. If maturity structure was well diversi…ed, we would expect this distribution to have a large mass around a speci…c value. 11 The …gure makes it clear, however, that there is signi…cant variation in maturity structures. Consider, for example, the fraction of long-term debt that is due in one year (i.e., in 2008) . Figures 3 and 4 ) is that they may concentrate debt issuance in particular years. To provide some descriptive evidence on these patterns, we use the Her…ndahl index, a common measure of concentration. From the sample of 1,067 …rms that we use in our main analysis, we select those whose long-term debt issuance variable (de…ned in detail below) is available for the last ten years; that is, from 1998 through 2007. A total of 790 …rms provide the information we need for this check. A Her…ndahl index is then calculated using the percentage of debt (normalized by assets) that the …rm issued in a particular year with respect to the total issuance within the entire 10-year window. If …rms perfectly diversify their debt issuance over this 10-year window, we would see a Her…ndahl index of 0:10. As it turns out, the average Her…ndahl index calculated from our COMPUSTAT sample is 0:28, suggesting that on average …rms issue debt in only 3 of 10 years. 1 0 We also know the amount of long-term debt that matures in more than …ve years (starting in 2013), though we do not have year-by-year information beyond …ve years.
1 1 For example, if …rms tend to regularly issue 10-year bonds we would expect to see a mass at the value of 10%.
The second condition that must be satis…ed to validate a strategy based on debt maturity is that the variation in debt maturity at the onset of the crisis needs to be exogenous to observed post-crisis outcomes. In particular, one might worry that the same variables that determine the pre-crisis distribution of long-term debt maturity might also in ‡uence post-crisis corporate investment. Suppose, for example, that …rms that have high growth opportunities tend to issue debt of longer maturities.
Then, it might not be surprising to observe that these …rms invest more during a crisis, relative to other …rms that have shorter-maturity debt.
Our empirical strategy addresses this issue in several complementary ways. First, we focus on maturity variation in long-term debt (only) rather than in short-versus long-term debt to sort …rms into treatment and control groups. This choice ensures that we are not simply comparing low-quality …rms that must issue short-term debt to …rms that can issue long-term debt. Second, we use matching estimator techniques (described in greater detail in Section 2.2) that minimize concerns about selection. This enables us to account for the e¤ect of observables by matching …rms with long-term debt maturing right after the credit crisis to "control …rms"of similar size, industry, credit ratings, Q, long-term leverage ratio, cash ‡ows, and cash holdings, with the key di¤erence between the treatment and control …rms being when their long-term debt, which was contracted long ago, happens to mature.
Third, we consider a number of variations to our baseline empirical design that allow us to further distinguish among alternative explanations for the results we obtain.
Among other things, we perform a battery of falsi…cation tests that replicate our matching estimator procedure in non-crisis periods. To see the logic behind these tests, consider . In one of our robustness checks, we will use this (long) pre-determined long-term debt maturity distribution to sort …rms into treatment and control groups. This test allows us to verify whether some managers were better able to anticipate the e¤ects of the credit crisis and re…nance their long-term debt before the credit crisis hit; that is, we can check whether unobserved managerial quality could explain the post-crisis di¤erences in investment behavior.
Matching Estimators
The use of matching estimators is a central feature of our test strategy and it is important to explain how we employ this technique. Recall, we want to test whether …rms that need to re…nance their longterm …nancial obligations at the time of a credit crisis alter decisions related to real-side variables.
In particular, we want to determine whether re-…nancing constraints a¤ect real …rm outcomes. Our goal is to develop an identi…cation strategy that is akin to an "experiment:"the …rm's long-term debt maturity structure and developments in the …nancial markets coincide such that the …rm is in need of re…nancing a large fraction of its debt in the midst of a sharp credit contraction. If a …rm's debt maturity is randomly assigned across …rms, then it would su¢ ce to compare the ex-post outcomes of …rms that had signi…cant debt maturing around the time of the crisis with those whose debt happened to mature at a later date. Our analysis, however, needs to allow for the fact that we are not using a true laboratory experiment, but instead relying on observational data.
Short of running a randomizing experiment with the …rms'…nancing constraints, the econometric challenge is to gauge …rms'likely outcomes had they not been caught between a credit crisis and the need to re…nance their debt. Since we are interested in the impact of …rm …nancing on real outcomes, we need to carefully identify a group of …rms that also face the credit crisis and are virtually similar to those whose debt matures during the crisis except for the fact that their debt is not maturing in the crisis.
Traditionally, researchers have dealt with this problem in the context of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators, where the group of interest is di¤erentiated from other observations via an indicator variable. Under this standard parametric approach, the impact of the variable of interest on observed outcomes is measured by the coe¢ cient returned for the indicator variable. The regression speci…cation is determined according to a set of theoretical priors about the endogenous variable. These models are often simple, linear representations of a particular theory. In corporate …nance research, controls such as …rm size, pro…tability, and leverage are customarily added to the speci…cation to capture additional sources of …rm heterogeneity. If left unmodeled, that sort of variation could jeopardize the OLS estimator as it could explain both a …rm's selection into the group of interest and its observed outcome.
A few concerns arise with the implementation of the standard OLS approach. First, the simple inclusion of control variables in the speci…cation does little to address the fact that the groups being compared may have very di¤erent characteristics (for example, comparison groups may have markedly di¤erent size or pro…tability distributions). Unfortunately, OLS estimates will not alert the researcher that a poor distributional overlap might yield an ine¤ective control set. Second, and relatedly, the OLS approach will allow for extreme outliers in the estimation, outliers that can bias the estimates of interest -standard OLS is notoriously weak in dealing with outliers. Finally, the OLS approach may place undue importance on linear model parametrization in the estimation process. Depending on the application, one can improve the estimation of group di¤erences by allowing for non-linear modeling of the outcomes of interest as well as by way of non-parametric methods.
The estimation strategy that we use in this paper is less parametric and more closely related to the notion of a randomized experiment. We use matching estimators in all of the tests performed in this paper. The idea behind this family of estimators is that of isolating treated observations (in our application, …rms with debt maturing during the crisis) and then, from the population of nontreated observations, look for control observations that best "match" the treated ones in a number of dimensions (covariates). In this estimation framework, the set of counterfactuals are restricted to the matched controls. In other words, it is assumed that in the absence of the treatment, the treated group would have behaved as the control group actually did. The matches are carefully made so as to ensure that treated and control observations have identical distributions along the covariates chosen Although a number of matching estimators are available, we employ the Abadie and Imbens (2002) estimator. 13 Their non-parametric procedure most naturally …ts our application. The Abadie-Imbens estimator allows one to match a treated …rm with a control …rm, with matching being made with respect to both categorical and continuous variables. The estimator aims at producing "exact"matches on categorical variables. Naturally, the matches on continuous variables will not be exact (though they should be close). The procedure recognizes this di¢ culty and applies a "bias-correction" component to the estimates of interest.
In matching estimations, the speci…cation used is less centered around the idea of representing a model that fully explains the endogenous variable. Instead, the focus is in ensuring that variables that might both in ‡uence the selection into treatment and observed outcomes are appropriately accounted for in the estimation. For example, the outcome that we are most interested in is investment spending. While there are numerous theories on the determinants of corporate investment, we only include in our estimations covariates for which one could make a reasonable case for simultaneity in the treatment-outcome relation. Among the list of categorical variables we include in our matching estimations are the …rm's industrial classi…cation and the rating of its public bonds (either speculative grade, investment grade, or unrated). Our non-categorical variables include the …rm's market-to-book ratio (or "Q"), cash ‡ow, size, and the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Although our original approach already makes it hard to tell a story in which the covariates we consider would predict both treatment and outcomes, it is commonly accepted that those covariates capture a lot of otherwise unobserved …rm heterogeneity.
Lastly, we note that we model the outcomes in our experiments in a di¤erenced form -we perform di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimations. Speci…cally, rather than comparing the levels of investment of the treatment and control groups, we compare the changes in investment across the groups after the treatment. We do so because the investment levels of the treated and controls could be di¤erent prior to the event de…ning the experiment, and continue to be di¤erent after that event, in which case our inferences could be potentially biased by these uncontrolled …rm-speci…c di¤erences.
Data Collection and Variable Construction
We use data from COMPUSTAT's North America Fundamentals Annual, Fundamentals Quarterly, and Ratings …les. We start from the quarterly …le and disregard observations from …nancial institutions (SICs 6000-6999), not-for-pro…t organizations and governmental enterprises (SICs greater than 8000), as well as ADRs. We drop …rms with missing or negative values for total assets (atq), capital expenditures (capxy), property, plant and equipment (ppentq), cash holdings (cheq), or sales (saleq).
We also drop …rms for which cash holdings, capital expenditures or property, plant and equipment are larger than total assets.
Our data selection criteria and variable construction approach follows that of Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) , who study the e¤ect of …nancing constraints on the management of internal funds, and that of Frank and Goyal (2003) , who look at external …nancing decisions. Similar to Almeida et al., we discard from the raw data those observations for which the value of total assets is less than $10 million, and those displaying asset growth exceeding 100% (including …rm-quarters with missing values). We further require that …rms' quarterly sales be positive and that the log of sales growth does not exceed 100%.
The data on debt maturity variables are only available in the COMPUSTAT annual …le. We merge the annual and the quarterly …les to make use of the maturity data in our quarterly tests.
COMPUSTAT annual items dd1, dd2, dd3, dd4, and dd5 represent, respectively, the dollar amount of long-term debt maturing during the …rst year after the annual report (long-term debt maturing in 2008
for …rms with a December 2007 …scal year-end), during the second year after the report (long-term debt maturing in 2009 for …rms with a December 2007 …scal year-end), during the third year after the report, and so on. COMPUSTAT annual item dltt represents the dollar amount of long-term debt that matures in more than one year. Accordingly, a …rm's total long-term debt can be calculated as dd1 + dltt.
We apply the following …lters to the debt variables. We delete …rms with total long-term debt (dd1 + dltt) greater than assets (at, in the annual …le) and …rms for which the data on debt maturity appears inconsistent. By inconsistent we mean the following. Some …rm show values of debt maturing in more than one year (dltt) that are lower than the sum of debt maturing in two, three, four, and …ve years (dd2 + dd3 + dd4 + dd5 ), while others have debt maturing in one year (dd1 ) greater than the sum of dd1 and dltt. These observations are deleted from the sample. For our baseline tests, we dis-regard …rms for which liabilities such as notes payables, bank overdrafts, and loans payable to o¢ cers and stockholders (item np in the annual …le) are greater than 1% of total assets. In our baseline tests, we require …rms to have long-term debt maturing beyond one year (dltt) that represents at least 5% of assets (at). These debt-related restrictions help assure that the results in our paper do not come from comparisons between "low-quality" …rms that need to rely on very short-term obligations with "high-quality" …rms that can issue long-term debt.
We focus on …rms that have 2007 …scal year-end months in September, October, November, December, or January. The sample of …rms with these …scal year-end months corresponds to more than 80% of the universe of …rms in …scal year 2007. This restriction is due to the timing of the credit shock, which In our basic experiment, the outcome variable is the change in the average quarterly investment over the …rst three quarters of 2008 relative to the …rst three quarters of 2007. 14 Investment is de…ned as the ratio of quarterly capital expenditures (COMPUSTAT's capxy) to the lag of quarterly property, plant and equipment (ppentq). As discussed earlier, we match …rms based on Q, cash ‡ow, size, cash holdings, and long-term leverage. Q is de…ned as the ratio of total assets plus market capitalization minus common equity minus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (atq + prccq cshoq -ceqq -txditcq) to total assets (atq). Cash ‡ow is de…ned as the ratio of net income plus depreciation and amortization (ibq + dpq) to the lag of quarterly property, plant and equipment. Size is de…ned as the log of total assets. Cash holdings are de…ned as the ratio of cash and short-term investments (cheq) to total assets.
Long-term leverage is the ratio of total long-term debt (dd1 + dltt) to total assets. Our matching estimator uses the averages of the …rst three quarters of 2007 of each of these variables as covariates.
We also match …rms both on industry and credit ratings categories. Industry categories are given by …rms'two-digit SIC codes. Our credit ratings categories follow the index system used by S&P and are de…ned as: investment grade rating (COMPUSTAT's splticrm from AAA to BBB-), speculative rating (splticrm from SD to BB+), and unrated (splticrm is missing). Matching treatment and control …rms within the same industry and within the same debt ratings categories ensures that di¤erences in …rms' underlying business conditions (e.g., product demand) and credit quality may not explain our results.
We construct treatment and control groups based on …rms'long-term debt maturity schedule. In our benchmark speci…cation, the treatment variable is de…ned by the ratio of long-term debt maturing within one year (dd1 ) to total long-term debt (dd1 + dltt). Firms for which this ratio is greater than 20% are assigned to the treatment group, while …rms for which this ratio is less than 20% are assigned to the non-treated group. 15 Our base procedure assigns 86 …rms to the treatment group. While we provide a full characterization of the treatment and control …rms in Section 3.1, it might be useful to describe a few concrete examples of …rms in our sample. We do this in turn.
Examples of Treatment and Control Firms
One of the …rms in our treatment group comes from the car rental business: Dollar-Thrifty. In the (who operates, among others, Bergner's and Belk stores). Bon-Ton's long-term debt due in one year was less that 1% of the total (but 28% of its debt was scheduled to come due in 2011). 16 
Results
We start by providing summary statistics for our samples of treated, non-treated, and control …rms.
Our initial goal is to show that our procedure does a good job of matching treatment to control …rms along observable dimensions. We then present our baseline empirical results.
Summary Statistics
Our matching approach is nonparametric, making it fairly robust to extreme observations. Treatment and control …rm outcomes, however, are compared in terms of mean di¤erences. To minimize the impact of gross outliers on these comparisons, we winsorize variables at the 0:5 percentile. Table 1 reports the (pre-crisis) median values of the variables used in our matching procedure across various data groups. We use the continuity-corrected Pearson 2 statistic to test for di¤erences in the medians of the variables of interest across those groups.
Panel A compares the 86 treated …rms in our sample with the remaining 981 …rms that are not assigned into the treated group. The treated …rms have higher median Q, cash ‡ows, and cash holdings. Treated …rms are also smaller and have a lower median leverage ratio. As discussed above, these sample di¤erences are expected, given that we are relying on observational data rather than running a true experiment. The goal of matching estimator techniques is to control for these distributional di¤erences, which could a¤ect both the selection into the treatment and the post-crisis outcomes. As in Table 1 , these di¤erences disappear when we compare the treated …rms to the group of closelymatched control …rms. In particular, Panel B of Table 2 shows that there are no statistical di¤erences in the distributions of the various matching covariates across the treated and control …rms. This evidence supports the assertion that the matching estimator moves our experiment closer to a test in which treatment and control groups di¤er only with respect to when their long-term debt happens to mature. 
The Real E¤ects of the 2007 Credit Crisis
We examine the investment behavior of our treated and control …rms around the 2007 credit crisis.
Before doing so, however, we show a brief comparison between the 86 treated …rms and the broader set of 981 …rms that we classify as non-treated. These comparisons help better characterize our main …ndings below. Panel A of Table 3 shows that prior to the crisis, both the treated and non-treated …rms were investing at di¤erent rates. The average investment-to-capital ratio in the three …rst quarters of 2007 (the pre-crisis period) is 7:8% for the treated …rms and 6:5% for the non-treated …rms.
The di¤erence is statistically signi…cant, as indicated in the third row of the panel. The fact that both groups of …rms have signi…cantly di¤erent investment levels in the pre-crisis period suggests that comparisons between the two groups could be potentially confounded by other factors. for non-treated …rms, investment fell to 6:0% (a fall of 0:6%). These …gures suggest that investment decreased by 1:6% more for …rms that happened to have a lot of long-term debt maturing right after the credit crisis hit, relative to the "general population" of …rms whose long-term debt did not come due so soon. Table 3 holdings, higher cash ‡ows, and lower leverage ratios than those in the general, non-treated sample population (see Table 1 ). By construction, …rms in the control group will then also have greater cash holdings, higher cash ‡ows, and lower leverage than the average sample …rm. Given that they did not have to re…nance signi…cant amounts of debt following the crisis, control …rms could use their more liquid positions to support investment going into 2008. In other words, corporate investment falls only for the group of high-cash, high-cash ‡ows, low-leverage …rms that happen to have long-term debt repayment spikes appearing in 2008 (treated …rms).
Panel B of
Panel B also reports the di¤erential change in investment that is produced by the Abadie-Imbens matching estimator (ATT). The ATT di¤erence is equal to 2:5%. 17 This is the central result of our paper. It indicates that investment for the treated …rms during the …rst three quarters of 2008 fell by about one-third of their pre-crisis investment levels. 18 More generally, the estimates in Panel B
imply that frictions that arose from …rms'debt maturity structures generated …nancing constraints the led to lower corporate investment rates following the 2007 credit crisis. These …ndings highlight the importance of debt maturity structure for corporate managers. They are also interesting for economic policymakers when designing policies aimed at softening the impact of credit contractions on the real economy.
Given the similarity between …rms in the treatment and control groups, the evidence presented is indicative of a causal e¤ect of debt maturity on investment. In order to further strengthen the interpretation of the results, we replicate exactly the same "experiment" that we run for the crisis period 
Extensions and Robustness Tests
In this section, we test additional implications of our basic argument, provide evidence that the benchmark results are robust to variations in the empirical speci…cation we use, and show that the 2007 crisis results (reported in Table 3) do not obtain in non-crisis periods. We also show that our results cannot be ascribed to di¤erential trends in the outcome of interest (investment rates), nor can they be attributed to di¤erential responses across treated and control …rms that could arise in recession periods (independently of the credit shortage). Finally, we provide a "back-of-the-envelope" calculation that shows how …rms with balloon debt payments in 2008 responded to the credit crisis along other dimensions besides investment policy.
Evidence from Non-Crisis Periods
Our identi…cation strategy relies on the assumption that …rms with maturing long-term debt …nd it di¢ cult to re…nance their obligations by tapping other external …nancing sources (e.g., long-term debt or bank …nancing). The 2007 credit crisis provides us with an ideal setting in which this assumption is likely to hold. By the same token, the assumption is unlikely to hold in periods of easier credit. If our identi…cation strategy is correct, we would then expect not to …nd the same e¤ects of maturity structure on investment during non-crisis periods. Panel C of Table 3 
Parallel Trends and Macro E¤ects 4.2.1 Parallel Trends
A standard concern about inferences from studies using the treatment-e¤ects framework is whether the data processes generating the treatment and control group outcomes had "common or parallel trends" prior to the treatment. Di¤erences in the post-treatment period can be ascribed to the treatment only when this assumption holds. The outcome variable of our study is the within-…rm change in investment spending. Recall, our matching procure rendered treatment and controls matches with very similar investment going back three quarters prior to the crisis (see Tables 1 and 2 ). The threat is that although quarterly investment levels might be similar for the two groups of …rms for about a year before 2007, those …rms'investments could be following di¤erent long-term trends in the period leading up to the crisis. While one could debate the likelihood of such patterns, the best way to address this concern is to look at data associated with the outcome variable (changes in investment) going farther back in time. It is apparent from the estimates reported in Table 5 , in particular from the p-values for t-and Pearson-tests, that our experiment's outcome variable was indistinguishable across treatment and control …rms going back as far as ten years prior to the fourth quarter of 2007. It is di¢ cult to make the case that the investment processes of …rms in those two groups were following very di¤erent trends before the credit crisis.
Macro E¤ects
Another potential concern regarding our di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach is whether other "macro e¤ects" a¤ecting both treatment and control …rms might explain the di¤erential behavior we observe in the post-treatment period (irrespective of any e¤ects arising from di¤erences in debt-maturity composition). This concern is valid when one has reasons to believe that there are important, latent di¤erences between treatment and control …rms and these di¤erences trigger sharp treatment-control contrasts in the post-treatment period because of other changes in the environment.
Like previous papers examining the consequences of a credit crisis, our post-treatment period encompasses a recession, a time when corporate demand for investment generally declines. The advantage of our strategy over other comparable studies is that it does not rely on …rm policies (e.g., leverage, size, or cash holdings) that are inherently linked to factors that can drive di¤erential behavior over the business cycle. For instance, it would not be surprising to see high-leverage/low-cash …rms performing particularly poorly during the recession that followed the 2007 crisis if confounding heterogeneity in …rm quality (related to pro…tability, risk, access to capital, etc.) was not properly accounted for. Regarding our strategy, in contrast, it is di¢ cult to articulate an argument for a systematic association between the maturity structure of long-term obligations and …rm quality. While the existing literature provides no evidence of such links, we design an additional test that speaks to this concern.
We argue that the combination of a credit supply shock with maturing debt may have pronounced e¤ects on corporate spending. The concern, however, is that the ensuing recession may somehow drive a di¤erential wedge in the post-crisis investment behaviors of treatment and control …rms, a di¤erence that could explain our …ndings. To examine this argument, we look for a period that precedes a recession, but that lacks a credit supply shock to identify a placebo treatment. In other words, we eliminate one of the key elements of our treatment strategy, but allow for the same macro e¤ects (demand contraction) that could potentially drive our 2007 …ndings to see if similar treatment-control contrasts emerge. If they do emerge, then there is reason to believe that developments in the general environment that followed our proposed treatment -and not the treatment -may explain our baseline results. This post-treatment-recession check makes it di¢ cult for one to argue that e¤ects that are associated with recessions -and not a credit supply shortage -might explain the results of our baseline tests.
Changing Long-Term Leverage Cuto¤s
Long-term debt maturity should matter only for …rms that have signi…cant amounts of long-term debt in their capital structures. Accordingly, in our benchmark speci…cation we considered only those …rms for which the ratio of long-term debt maturing in more than one year to total assets was higher than 5%.
In Table 6 , we experiment with di¤erent inclusion rules that are designed to check the logic behind our strategy. Increasing the cuto¤ for the fraction of long-term debt in …rms'capital structures should result in larger post-crisis e¤ects of maturity on investment. By the same token, including …rms that do not have signi…cant long-term debt should weaken our estimated e¤ects. Table 6 shows evidence that is consistent with these hypotheses. In the …rst column, we report the changes in investment that obtain when we allow into the sample those …rms whose long-term debt maturing in more than one year is less than 5% of assets (i.e., we eliminate the 5% debt-to-asset cut-o¤). Consistent with our expectations, the estimated di¤erences between treatment and control groups disappears after this change. The simple di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimate is 0:0%, while the ATT is now positive at 0:2% (both are statistically insigni…cant). This contrasts with our benchmark result, which is reported in the second column of the table.
In the third column of Table 6 , we perform an alternative experiment that only includes …rms whose long-term debt maturing in more than one year is greater than 10% of assets. Now, the fall in investment for treated …rms relative to control …rms increases to 3:4% of capital (from 2:5% in the baseline experiment). This evidence helps further substantiate the hypothesis that treated …rms found it di¢ cult to re…nance their maturing long-term debt in the post-crisis period, and thus were forced to substantially cut their investment spending. 
Pre-Determined Maturity Tests
Our baseline experiment uses maturity variables measured at the end of 2007, just a few months following the August credit panic. As explained in Section 2.3, we made this choice to make sure that we capture the extent to which …rms are constrained by debt maturity in the aftermath of the crisis. This requirement should increase the power of our tests. However, it may raise the concern that measured variation in maturity re ‡ects the anticipated e¤ects of the crisis. A particularly problematic alternative explanation is the following. Suppose that higher quality managers were more likely to anticipate the credit crisis in early 2007, or even 2006. Then, it is possible that unobservable managerial quality could explain both longer maturity pro…le and superior …rm performance in the aftermath of the crisis. Such re…nancing in anticipation of the …nancial crisis by "smart CEOs" would leave only the "dumb CEOs" with long-term debt maturing in 2008, and these "dumb CEOs" may be forced to cut investment for non-maturity-related reasons after the credit crisis hits. The placebo tests of Section 4.1 do not address this self-selection concern because this is a crisis-speci…c story.
A simple way to ensure that the anticipation of the crisis by "smart CEOs" does not Other than using alternative pre-determined maturity pro…les to assign treatment and non-treatment groups, all other components of the experiment remain unchanged. Accordingly, the outcome variables are de…ned identically to those in Table 3 , that is, changes in investment between the …rst three quarters of 2008 and the …rst three quarters of 2007.
The results (untabulated) suggest that the pre-determined maturity pro…les also help predict changes in investment around the credit crisis. As expected, the e¤ects of maturity structure on investment ( 1:4% when using the 2005 maturity and 0:6% when using the 2003 maturity) are somewhat smaller than those estimated in Table 3 , nonetheless, they are still economically meaningful. 22 These results suggest that the managerial quality hypothesis cannot explain the relation between debt maturity and investment that we report in Table 3 .
Di¤erent Speci…cations for the Matching Estimator
We have also experimented with several variations in our procedure to construct treatment and control groups, as well as in the set of matching covariates. To illustrate the robustness of our results, we report two of these exercises in this section.
Our benchmark speci…cation de…nes the treatment group as all …rms for which the ratio of longterm debt maturing within one year to total long-term debt is greater than 20%. The non-treated group contains all the other …rms that satisfy the sampling restrictions (in particular, a minimum level of long-term debt over assets). As an alternative approach, we considered a control group that includes only …rms that have more than 20% of their long-term debt maturing in exactly …ve years (that is, in 2012). These …rms are similar to those in the treatment group in that they also allow their maturity structures to be poorly diversi…ed across maturities. However, they happen to have concentrated their maturity in a time period that lies far in the future. 23 The estimated di¤erence in investment changes (the matching estimator ATT) remains negative, equal to 1:6%, and statistically signi…cant (standard error of 0:9) after this change in de…nition.
We have also experimented with including the 2007 investment level among the set of matching covariates to ensure that we are comparing …rms that were at the same starting point of investment before the crisis. The matching estimator's average treatment e¤ect is virtually unchanged after this modi…cation in the set of covariates; point estimate of 2:3%, with a standard error of 0:9.
How Did the Treated Firms Respond to the Credit Crisis?
The evidence so far suggests that …rms with large amounts of debt maturing in 2008 were forced to decrease investment in order to be able to repay their maturing debt. However, investment is not the only policy variable that these …rms could have adjusted in the aftermath of the crisis. Here, we examine post-crisis changes in other policies that the treated …rms could have used to absorb the e¤ect of the credit squeeze. Even if it was di¢ cult or impossible for …rms to respond to the crisis by issuing additional external …nance, they could potentially make up for the debt payment by adjusting other variables, such as drawing down cash reserves, reducing stocks of inventory, repurchasing fewer shares, and/or cutting dividends. If the treated …rms found it necessary to cut investment (which is a costly measure), one would also expect them to adjust, for example, the amount of share repurchase activities that they undertake in the aftermath of the crisis. 24 In addition, one could expect …rms to draw down on their cash balances and reduce inventories. The literature suggests that cash balances are held in part to hedge against negative shocks such as the 2007 crisis (see Almeida, Campello, and Weisbach (2004) ). Moreover, there is evidence that …rms use inventories to smooth out the e¤ects of ‡uctuations in the availability of internal funds (Fazzari and Petersen (1993) ).
To provide some evidence on these additional policies, we perform a simple, "back-of-the-envelope"
analysis of how the …rms in our experiment responded to the credit crisis. Across our treated …rms, we calculated the average amount of long-term debt due in 2008, as well as the amount of "cuts" conducted elsewhere to help pay o¤ this debt (besides investment reductions) -inventories, share repurchases, dividends, and cash holdings. These variables were present for 77 of our 86 treated …rms.
We use these …rms in the subsequent analysis. strong aversion to cutting dividends (see Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) ), it is perhaps not surprising that dividend cuts during 2008 accounted for only 1% of the amount of debt due for the treated …rms, with the remaining 29% to be explained by other factors (such as reductions in R&D, labor costs, and asset sales). 25 While admittedly done solely for purposes of providing a crude approximation for how the treated …rms responded to the …nancial crisis, the set of numbers depicted in Figure 5 …ts our economic in-tuition very well. In particular, the …gure suggests that …rms that were burdened with large amounts of maturing debt in 2008 drew heavily on their least costly sources of funds (such as cash holdings) in order to mitigate the e¤ects of maturing debt, but had to ultimately cut back on real activities, such as investment spending.
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Concluding Remarks
We use the August 2007 credit panic to assess the e¤ect of …nancial contracting on real corporate policies. In particular, we test whether …rms with large fractions of their long-term debt maturing at the time of the crisis observe more pronounced negative outcomes than otherwise similar …rms whose debt structure is such that they did not need to re…nance during the crisis. Our empirical methodology aims at replicating an experiment-like design in which we control for observed and time-invariant unobserved …rm heterogeneity via a di¤erence-in-di¤erences matching estimator.
We …nd evidence that long-term …nancial contracting can have signi…cant implications for …rms' real and …nancial policies when they face a credit shock. Firms whose long-term debt was largely maturing right after the third quarter of 2007 reduced their quarterly investment rates by 2:5% more than otherwise similar …rms whose debt was due well after the crisis. This relative decrease in investment for …rms with maturity "spikes"during the crisis is statistically signi…cant and economically large (approximately one-third of the pre-crisis level of investment for these …rms). A number of falsi…cation and placebo tests con…rm our inferences about the e¤ect of credit supply shocks on corporate policies.
Our results contribute to the literature in a number of ways. First, our unique identi…cation strategy reveals a novel link between debt maturity and corporate investment. In particular, our results point to the importance of maturity structure for corporate …nancial ‡exibility. As a matter of corporate policy, our study highlights the extra attention …rm managers should pay to the maturity pro…le of their …rms'debt. Second, our results provide evidence that the 2007 credit crisis had signi…cant real e¤ects on corporate behavior in 2008. Third, our evidence suggests that debt maturity structure is an important variable in understanding how credit supply shocks spread through the corporate sectorbeyond what one can learn by looking at …rms'debt levels. Undoubtedly, understanding the e¤ects of credit cycles (and credit crises in particular) is not only of interest for corporate …nance researchers, but also important for economic policymakers. More broadly, our …ndings provide new evidence that …nancial contracting has causal e¤ects on real corporate outcomes. Importantly, we are able to characterize one precise channel (a contracting feature) that shows how …nancing a¤ects investment. This table presents an estimate of the change in investment from the first three quarters of a given year to the first three quarters of the next year. The first row replicates the Difference-in-Differences and Matching Estimator (ATT) from Panel B of Table 3 and the second row replicates the Difference-in-Differences and Matching Estimator (ATT) from Panel C of Table 3 . Analogous results are then presented for the other years. The treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year is greater than 20 percent and control firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year is less than or equal to 20 percent. Control firms are the closest matches to the treated firms based on a set of firm characteristics (see the description in Table 3 leverage ratio of more than 0%, leverage ratio of more than 5%, and leverage ratio of more than 10%. The leverage ratio cutoff of 5% presented in the middle column (i.e., long-term debt represents more than 5 percent of assets) reproduces the results presented in Panel B of Table 3 for ease of comparison. The treated firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year (i.e., 2008) is greater than 20 percent of total long-term debt and control firms are defined as those for which the percentage of long-term debt maturing within one year is less than or equal to 20 percent of total long-term debt. Control firms are the closest matches to the treated firms based on a set of firm characteristics (see the description in Table 3 
